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EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY IN WISCONSIN
J. L. Gillin
The author is Professor Emeritus of Sociology in the University of Wisconsin.
He is former chairman of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology and a
past president of the American Sociological Society. His chief interest has been
the field of criminology and penology. In 1931 he published a study of the prison
systems of a number of countries, which he visited in 1928. In 1946 appeared his
The Wisconsin Criminal, the results of his study of 486 inmates of the Wisconsin
Stat. Prison. This paper is an abstract of a study on parole, probation and execu-
tive clemency in Wisconsin, the complete Ms. of which is ready for publication.
Thi!; article points up the chaotic procedure characteristic of clemency procedures
in one state, which probably is not peculiar to Wisconsin.-EDITOR.
My interest in the subject of pardons goes back to 1926. In looking
through the literature for material on the subject to my surprise I found
at that time there was only one serious study of the matter, that by
Dr. Christen Jensen. He had made a study of the pardon laws of the
various States of the United States for his Ph.D. thesis at the University
of Chicago. My interest was more deeply intrigued after I had served
for four years on the Pardon Board appointed by Governor La Follette
in 1935. At that time there was very little written anywhere on the
subject. Most of the references to the subject I cited in Chapter
XXXIII of my Criminology and Penology. Since then a number of
articles and monographs have appeared.1 None of these writers made
any af:tempt to analyze the pardons actually granted in any state or in,
the United States.
On beginning service on the first Pardon Board in Wisconsin I found
that there were no established principles according to which pardons
were granted. When Governor La Follette talked with me about the
matter he indicated that he thought a very important function of the
pardoning power was to equalize the sentences imposed by the various
courts of the State for the same crime. This he considered important
because after the men reached prison comparison of the crimes and the
sentences they had received led those who had received longer sentences
than others for the same crime to feel that they had been dealt with
unjustly. Such a feeling did not result in good behavior in the prison
and did not make for an attitude of respect for the courts. When the
Board got under way and had had some experience, it became apparent
that such was only one, and perhaps not the most important, function
of executive clemency. Therefore, early in our experience on the Board
a statement was formulated by the writer and informally approved by
1. See Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures; Vol. III, "Pardon," and the
Bibliography cited therein; Humbert, W. H., THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT,
American Council on Public Affairs.
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the Board and the Governor on "Fundamental Pardon Policies." Under
the types of cases to be considered were the following:
1. Those in which later evidence had been discovered showing the
innocence of the convicted, but in which it was too late under existing law
for the court to take action for correction of the sentence.
2. Those in which there was a plea of guilty based on a misunder-
standing of the nature of the charge.
3. Those in which there was. a plea of guilty on the promise by an
officer of the law that he would intervene with the court to secure a short
sentence or probation, but which he had not done, or in which he had
been unsuccessful.
4. Those in which the sentence given was unusually severe judged
by sentences given others of equal culpability. This was that in the mind
of Governor La Follette, as mentioned above.
5. Those in which the previous history of the prisoner and his
attitude in the institution indicated that he would probably be well
behaved if released under supervision, but who could not be paroled
under the existing statutes, and who could not have his sentence reduced
by the court.
6. Those who probably could be safely paroled if the sentence were
reduced.
The principles to be followed by the Board were:
1. Disregard of political, organizational or religious affiliations.
2. Due (but not undue) regard for the attitudes of the people, in-
cluding the prosecuting attorney and the judge, of the community from
which he was sentenced.
3. Careful consideration of the judicial history of the case (such as
is referred to in 1-4 above).
4. Careful investigation of the background of the prisoner before
he was committed to the institution including social, economic, psycho-
logical and emotional backgrounds.
It is easily seen from these statements that the Board felt that in
most cases the important matter was to work closely with the Board
of Parole. Upon it we had to depend for much of the information as
to the institutional behavior and the pre-sentence backgrounds of the
case under consideration.
PRELIMINARY STUDIES
As the studies on parole and probation proceeded I began to wonder
[Vol. 42
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
if a study of executive clemency in the State might not be of value. Such
a study might indicate whether there was any uniformity in the exercise
of this function by different governors, and whether such a study might
indicate how this function should be performed in the interests of even-
handed justice and of security to the State. Consequently a number of
studies of executive clemency in Wisconsin was started. The first of
these was one by Dr. William Oldigs, finished in 1941, designed to
do two things: (1) to describe the history of pardons especially in the
legislation and court decisions in Wisconsin, and (2) to compare the
number and types of clemency granted from 1901-1935 in order to
ascertain whether the governors had different clemency policies. The
second, assigned to Mr. Gustave H. Amerell was intended to compare
the clemency activities of Wisconsin governors over an eight year period.-
Comparison was made between Governors Kohler and Schmedeman
taken together and Governor Philip La Follette's first two terms. Also
in this study comparison was made between Governor La Follette's
practice in his first term when he had no advisory pardon board and
his practice during his second term when he had such a board. The
purpose of the third study, the data on which were assembled by Mr.
David Steinicke and Mr. Robert Strain, was to learn whether there
was any association between the policies of governors in extending
executive clemency and the success or failure after release of those to
whom some form of clemency had been extended. This study covered
only the period between 1930 and 1938. The fourth and last was by
Miss Margaret G. Smith under my direction. This inquiry had two
objects: (1) to test statistically the efficacy of the clemency policies of
the different governors as measured by success or failure and (2) to see
if there were any common factors associated with their later conduct
between parolees, probationers and pardonees. In actual practice the
comparison was found to be possible between only two of three periods
into which the years between 1900 and 1938 naturally fell. The first
period, 1900-1920 was found to be so sadly lacking in adequate records
that it had to be omitted from the Smith study.
THE OLDIGS STUDY
What were the results of these studies? The chief findings are as
follows:
1. The Oldigs study besides showing the historical development of
the pardoning power in this State indicated that
(a) Apparently each governor held different ideas about the function
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of executive clemency. While all of them believed that clemency should
be extended to those who had suffered a miscarriage of justice, they
varied as to whether a man should be granted an absolute pardon, a
conditional pardon, or should have a commutation of sentence.
(b) There was no consistency between the different administrations
in extending executive clemency if the ratio of pardons to the populations
of the penal and correctional institutions of the State is considered.
(c) The different governors appeared to pay very little attention to
the type of crime committed. The only exception to this was the ten-
dency of Blaine and Zimmerman to pardon prohibition law violators.
(d) Attention to length of sentence imposed and length of sentence
served was not given equal attention by the different governors.
(e) For the whole period there is some evidence that certain gov-
ernors made an unusual proportion of grants of clemency to men sen-
tenced from the two most populous counties of the State. Milwaukee
county with 24.7 percent of the State's population in 1930 was granted
38.9 percent of the pardons: Dane with 3.8 percent of the population,
5.4 percent of the pardons. These counties contributed to the prison
population 24.7 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively. The following
table shows how the governors varied in the proportion of grants of
clemency to prisoners from these two counties composed with the total
to prisoners from the other counties of the State.
Governor Milwaukee Co. Other Cos. Dane Co.
LaFollette, R ................ 41.9% 48.8% 9.3%
Davidson ................... 37.2 55.0 7.8
McGovern ................. 38.9 54.8 6.3
Philipp ..................... 39.7 53.0 7.3
Blaine ..................... 41.0 54.6 4.4
Zimmerman ................ 48.7 45.6 5.7
Kohler ..................... 20.9 76.8 2.3
LaFollette, P. ............... 31.5 65.9 2.6
Schmedeman ................ 28.9 65.7 5.4
No clear evidence appeared that political considerations account for
the preponderance of grants of clemency to these two populous counties.
But the facts suggest that governors were moved by the number and
influence of persons *ho appear for a prisoner. In the absence of de-
tailed information about the applicant it is but natural for governors to
give weight to the testimony of people whom they know.
(f) The Wisconsin Statutes require that each application for execu-
tive clemency shall be accompanied by a written communication from the
judge and district attorney who participated in the trial, if such can be
obtained, indicating their views regarding the application. In a murder
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case the recommendation of the judge alone is required. This study
shows that the district attorneys in a slightly larger percenfage of the
cases than the judges favored the application, the former favoring in
49.9 percent of the cases in which clemency was granted, and the judges
in 43.0 percent. The governors differed decidedly in acting in accordance
with the recommendation of these officials. The elder LaFollette and
Davidson, save for one case by LaFollette, granted no clemency in
opposition to the recommendations of these two local officials. Kohler
granted only four opposed by the prosecuting attorney and three opposed
by the judge. But McGovern and all the later governors granted many
applications opposed by these officials.
(g) The Wisconsin Constitution requires the governor to report to
the Legislature all grants of clemency and to give his reason for granting
them.. Public opinion is the only check on the pardoning power of the
governor. This report to the Legislature gives him his chance to report
to the public his reasons for his acts. 'Oldigs' survey found 65 reasons
stated by the governors during this third of a century. He reduced them
to 43. Six of these accounted for more than 10 percent each of the total
reasons. These six were "doubt of guilt" 10.2 percent, "excessive sen-
tence" 12.2 percent, "good institutional record" 20.3 percent, "depend-
ents" 14.3 percent, "first offense" 25.8 percent, and "to make eligible for
parole" 14.4 percent. These percentages fluctuated, however, between
the different governors and between the earlier and the later part of the
period covered by the study. On the whole "doubt of guilt" and "de-
pendents" diminished, while the others increased in importance. Prob-
ably these variations reflect in part changing conceptions of the way to
handle offenders with increasing emphasis upon probation for first
offenders, and upon parole, and in part on provisions for the care of
dependents. The list is most instructive in showing that the governors
had no fundamental philosophy and no clear-cut policies concerning the
clemency function.
THE AMERELL STUDY
The report by Amerell is a special study on Executive clemency to
answer two questions: (1) Was there any uniformity of policy shown
in the grants of clemency by three recent governors, Schmedeman and
Kohler, one term each, and P. LaFollette, two terms? and (2) Was
there any difference in Governor LaFollette's practices before and after
he had a pardon board? The first question was intended to apply statis-
tical tests to the different practices of various governors. The Oldigs
study did not test the differences for significance. Amerell's study showed
1952]
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that the three governors close together in time without doubt conceived
,the function of pardon in entirely different terms. They were acting
under the same legal provisions concerning the handling of prisoners,
hence their differences must have been due to their own personal notions
of the purposes of clemency. Of Schmedeman's and Kohler's grants of
clemency 28 percent were for full pardons, 23 percent conditional, and
49 percent commutation of sentence. LaFollette's were 12 percent full
pardons, 11 percent conditional, and 77 percent commutation of sentence.
These are differences which could have occurred by chance less than once
in 100 times. It is clear that LaFollette used commutation much more
than the others in order to make the clemency function aid in releasing
men on parole.
The answer to the second question is that LaFollette with the advice
of the Pardon Board used commutation slightly less, but that he denied
applications somewhat more frequently when advised by the Pardon
Board than during the term before the appointment of the Board (77
percent compared with 72 percent). Of the 209 recommendations for
commutation of sentence made by the Board, 1935-37, 75 percent were
made in order that the men might become eligible for parole, 21 percent
that their sentences might be equalized with those of others committed
for like crimes. The increase of denials between the first and second
terms of LaFallotte was probably due to the greater care in investigating
the cases by the Pardon Board.
THE STERNICKE-STRAIN STUDY
The third study attacked another problem. Is it possible by a study
of events in the history of those granted clemency to identify those
events which contribute to success or failure after release from incar-
ceration? This is the first attempt known to the writer ever to have
been made to ascertain whether by taking into account facts in the history
of those granted executive clemency one could say what facts have a rela-
tionship to the behavior of men when released. It covered the grants of
clemency 1930-38, a total of 501 cases.
About 24 items in the men's histories as found in the records of the
cases granted clemency were considered. Only six of these showed any
significant relationship to the man's post-release behavior. The six were:
(1) Nature of the crime. Those convicted of sex offenses showed
a lower proportion of failures than the offenders against person or
property.
(2) Size of community where crime was committed. Those from
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places, of 100,000 or over had a much higher failure rate than the
average.
(3) Age at conviction and at date of clemency. These were two
separate items analyzed, but since it is clear that they are closely corre-
lated, I have cited them as one. Those aged 21-23 at time of conviction
and those 36 and over had lower failure rates than could be theoretically
expected. Those under 30 at date of clemency and those 36 and over
also had lower than the theoretical expectation.
(4) Previous criminal history. Those with no previous conviction
got into trouble after clemency was granted less often than those who
had a previous record.
(5) Number of' accomplices. Those with no accomplices kept out of
trouble to a significantly greater degree than the others.
(6) Occupation at date of crime. The only subcategory of signifi-
cance was "Unemployed." These had the highest rate of failure.
As the third study covered only the period 1930-38, I wished to see
whether its findings remained stable in a study of clemency grants over
a longer period of time. Therefore I had a search made of the records
in the governor's office from 1900 to the end of 1938. Because of the'
changes in the records it was found that there were roughly three periods
in these 38 years-1900-19, 1920-29 and 1930-38. When tested statis-
tically it was clear that these three periods were not one universe but
three.
With that problem settled, that there were three universes in the
entire period, the next question was, Within each of the three do any
categories distinguish between success and failure after release? So
much information was lacking in the records of the first period, 1900-
1919, that the categories were not dependable. In the second period,
1920-29, there were but two categories which distinguished significantly
between success and failures-Previous criminal history and Number of
accomplices. In the third period, 1930-38, there were the six categories
cited above. Previous criminal history and number of accomplices per-
sisted through both the second and third periods. Two of the six cer-
tainly and the 'other four probably could safely be used in forecasting the
probability of success of those who apply for executive clemency.
THE ODEGARD STUDY
One other analysis was made of those who had received executive
clemency in Wisconsin. The data were taken from a study by Mr.
Burnett Odegard, Chief Statistician of the Board of Control, with the
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help of WPA workers for the United States Attorney General's Survey
of Release Procedures. From these cards we had extracted those which
had been granted executive clemency 1927-1938. There were 591 of
these. In part they cover the same period as the third study in our series.
This study took into consideration many other categories than those
included in ours. Only three of the categories showed any significant
difference between the successes and failures. These were Months re-
maining of the sentence, Nativity, and Economic status. The last of
these was more or less subjective, and was not tested for reliability.
The sub-categories were "Good," "Fair," "Poor." Under the category
"Nativity," this study showed that those with one or both parents
foreign-born in contrast with those with both parents native-born had
the lowest rate of failure. Those with five years. or more remaining of
their sentence less "good time" had the lowest percentage of failure.
Those of "good" economic status had the lowest rate of failure. None
of these coincided with those found of importance in our study of 1930-
38. The upshot of these various pieces of investigation of the behavior
of those granted clemency is that, except for our study of those granted
clemency from 1920 to 1938, there is no consistency of results, and that
for that period there were only two categories which remained stable
throughout. On this showing what is the value of these studies?
LESSONS FROM THE STUDIES
Several lessons can be learned from these rather unfruitful studies-
unfruitful if one is concerned with a prediction table with the aid of
which a pardon board can select those whom they will recommend for
clemency. Some of these are:
(1) The data now found in the records of the governor's office have
little value unless the board is willing to use only the two factors which
remained stable over the two periods studied-Criminal history and
Number of accomplices. Since most of the men had no accomplices,
judgment as to whether to recommend for clemency would rest largely
upon the other factor. Mr. Wood found in his study of parolees that he
could predict outcome on parole just as well from Criminal history as
from either 10 or 20 factors. A Pardon Board might try that and
follow up with a study to see what happened.
(2) A Board might try to use the six factors found significantly
associated with success or failure in the study 1930-38. By following
that practice with a study of the results it could ascertain whether it is
of any value.
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(3) A better plan would be to conclude that with the data now found
in the records it is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty
what a. man will do on release. But it should not stop there. The Board,
or some other body, should attempt by interview to ascertain the per-
sonal characteristics of a large sample of the prisoners, and the experi-
ences associated with the development of those characteristics, and then
follow up with a study of the behavior of the men granted clemency to
see what characteristics are associated with success and failure. From
our work it may be assumed that the data now available do not reveal
the subtle but probably important factors in conduct. The problem
should not be abandoned, but should be attacked in a more profound
way.
Such a study should be a continuing one with a sample of~the prisoners
as th:y are admitted to the penal and correctional institutions, and as
they are released by any means whatsoever. Once a body of knowledge
of this kind became available it should be continued because character-
istics and the experiences associated therewith might change with time.
That would enable the authorities to keep up with whatever changes
might occur.
(4) Either the Board itself, or better, a separate governmental
authority, should have such a study as its responsibility. It could do the
study itself, or arrange with the University of Wisconsin to do the re-
search. It might make available to the University a number of scholar-
ships to which would be appointed outstanding graduate students, or the
University authorities might make available a number of scholarships,
or graduate research assistantships, for this purpose.
(5) Since it would be impossible without the expenditure of a larger
sum of money for this research than probably could be obtained, only a
part of those given executive clemency would be studied. That would
make possible a comparison of results between. those who had been
granted clemency on the basis of facts obtained in the interview and
those who had not been interviewed. That would provide a test of the
criteria developed by the research. The results of the research would
be available also for a study of parole.
(6) It seems probably that before successful prediction for pardonees
is possible a study will have to be made also of their experiences in the
prison or reformatory, and of the experiences they have after release
from the prison. Otherwise we are assuming that experience in prison
and after release has nothing to do with their behavior on release.
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(7) I had comparisons made between the parolees, the probationers
and those granted executive clemency covered by our series of studies.
The results showed clearly that on the basis of the data in the records
as now kept the factors associated with success or failure are different
for the three groups. On almost every category the differences between
the three classes were so great that they could not have occurred by
chance.
If one were to reach any conclusion from these studies it would be
that on the basis of the data to be found now in the records it is impos-
sible to predict future behavior of the pardonee in Wisconsin, except for
one or two categories, and except for a very short period of time. It
should be said, however, that our findings are based only on data in the
Wisconsin records, and do not apply to data found in the records of
other states. It may be that the latter reveal more of the subtle factors
in the behavior of prisoners. For Wisconsin we shall have to dig deeper
into what motivates conduct, before we can hope to provide a prediction
table for the guidance of those who grant probation, parole and execu-
tive clemency.
Altogether aside from the question of using data to guide an adminis-
trative board or a governor in granting clemency this study revealed
that under present laws from about half to over three-fourth of the acts
of clemency exercised in this State for over a quarter of a century were
commutations of sentence, 14.4 percent of these commutations were to
make prisoners eligible for parole. This situation indicates how inade-
quate were the parole laws during the time covered by the study. So
inflexible were they that the parole board in many cases could not release
a man on parole until the pardoning authority has cut the sentence. On
any theory this is indefensible. Thus some prisoners had to spend time
in prison who could have been out earning their living under supervision.
At that time it cost about $500 a year to keep a man in prison. In
contrast it cost about $30 to supervise him on parole. But the cost in
dollars is not the most important aspect of the matter. If a man is kept
too long in prison, the hope of his rehabilitation fades.
Also, under the laws on the books at the time of the study when the
pardon authority commuted a prisoner's sentence in order to make him
eligible for parole, it necessarily limited the time he could be kept on
parole to the maximum of the commuted sentence. 2 whereas, if the
parole board were free to grant parole at such time as in their judgment
2. The 1943 legislature modified the Statutes governing parole of recidivists by making
no distinction between them and first Gffenders, and removed some of the limitations on
parole eligibility.
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is best for society and for the rehabilitation of the prisoner, they could
keep him under supervision until the expiration of his original, maximum
sentence. Thus, the functions of the parole board and of the pardon
authority would be more clearly differentiated.
An alternative is for the State to adopt laws similar to those of the
United States, which provide that judges in granting suspended sentence
and probation may make the period of probation longer than the sen-
tence imposed, and that those paroled may be kept under supervision
until the expiration of their maximum sentences without deduction
for "good time." However, it is better to give to an administrative
board the determination of when a man is to be paroled and how long
he should be kept on parole. Then action can be taken in the light of all
of the facts in the case. California has enacted an Adult Authority law
which gives it greater autonomy than is to be found in most states to
handle some of these problems by an administrative board.
